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I. Introduction
New York City has the largest market for cooperative apart-
ments in the nation. The popularity of cooperatives is due, at least
in part, to their self-governing aspect, which is effectuated by a
board of directors. Self-governance enables tenant-shareholders to
carefully maintain and control their living environment including
who gains admission to the cooperative. The courts grant coopera-
tive boards great discretion in the management of their affairs and
usually defer to their decisions when challenged. This general rule
is rooted in the seminal case of Levandusky v. One Fifth Avenue
Apartment Corp.,' in which the New York Court of Appeals held
that a standard analogous to the deferential business judgment
rule2 was to be applied when co-op board decisions are challenged.
Cooperative self-governance, however, occasionally gives rise to
disputes and litigation between cooperative boards and tenant-
shareholders when cooperation breaks down and individual self-
interest takes over. Also, disputes sometimes arise between coop-
eratives and prospective purchasers when cooperative boards, in
their zeal to tightly control the make-up of the cooperative popula-
tion, reject an applicant. When an applicant claims that the rejec-
tion was based on their race, religion or other protected class,
courts will not hesitate to review the cooperative's decision-making
* Chief Administrative Law Judge, City of New York Commission on Human
Rights. B.A., Yale University, 1978; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1982.
** Associate, Steel, Bellman, Ritz & Clark, P.C. Former Law Clerk to Chief Ad-
ministrative Law Judge, City of New York Commission on Human Rights. B.A., La-
fayette College, 1987; J.D., City University of New York School of Law, 1994.
1. 75 N.Y.2d 530, 553 N.E.2d 1317, 554 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1990).
2. The business judgment rule prevents the court's interference with the actions
and decisions of corporate directors when they exercise good faith and honest judg-
ment in making business decisions. Id. at 537-38, 553 N.E.2d at 1321, 554 N.Y.S.2d at
811.
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process and apply civil rights laws despite their general reluctance
to do so.
New York City has one of the nation's broadest civil rights laws
applicable to housing cooperatives. The city law, combined with
federal and state protections, provides potential cooperative resi-
dents with an array of legal options for pursuing broad relief when
they believe their rejection was based on unlawful discrimination.
The numbers reveal, however, that despite numerous allegations of
systematic and individual discrimination in the cooperative housing
market, few claims are pursued. This article reviews reported
cases, mostly in New York State, and identifies trends and common
principles among them.
Part II provides an overview of the cooperative housing market
in New York City and discusses statistical and anecdotal evidence
of discrimination within that market. Part III discusses the legal
framework of housing cooperatives and specifically focuses on co-
op board decision-making power concerning share transfers. Part
IV provides an overview of city, state and federal anti-discrimina-
tion laws applicable to cooperatives.
Part V, the heart of the article, focuses on cases in which anti-
discrimination laws have been applied to cooperatives. It includes
a discussion of the seminal case Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc.3
as well as a review of objective and subjective factors raised by
cooperatives defending against discrimination claims. Part VI con-
tains recommendations for cooperatives and prospective
applicants.
II. Overview of Cooperative Housing Market
Reviewing the application of the city's Human Rights Law to the
sale of cooperative housing units reveals the important role this
form of home ownership plays in the city's housing market. In
1984 there were 247,000 cooperative apartments in New York
City.4 By 1995, the number of cooperative apartments increased to
416,000, housing over one million New Yorkers.5 Although ap-
proximately half the city's cooperative apartments are in Manhat-
tan, they exist in all five boroughs as well and are generally
3. 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979).
4. N.R. Kleinfield & Tracie Rozhon, In Flat Market, Co-op Life Has Ups and
Downs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at Al, B2 (Chart as corrected on November 2,
1995).
5. Id.
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accessible to all socio-economic groups.6 Cooperative ownership is
relatively rare outside of New York City, where 95% of all such
units in the nation were registered in 1980.7
The rapid proliferation of cooperative apartments in New York
City has made this form of ownership virtually impossible for New
York home buyers to ignore. Navigating the maze of often arbi-
trary application procedures has become a rite of passage among
urban dwellers who wish to join these "private clubs." Tales of be-
fuddled applicants facing hostile interviewers, malicious inquiries,
unreasonable financial demands and baffling rejections have be-
come a colorful, if disconcerting, part of urban folklore.8 Although
these tales may entertain, amuse and elicit expressions of sympa-
thy, there is much at stake in the cooperative application process.
Behind the scenes, cooperatives enjoy a unique form of self-gov-
ernance through their boards of directors. Legal commentators de-
scribe cooperative boards as "residential private governments
exercising legislative ... powers over those living within their terri-
torial boundaries."9 This power extends to those who wish to
purchase cooperative shares.
The board of directors' role in the transfer of cooperative shares
ostensibly protects each shareholder's monetary investment and
the building's financial integrity through the selection of financially
sound applicants. Cooperative boards also maintain the building's
quality of life and social exclusivity through the selection process
which serves as a communal screen allowing "club" admission only
to those who "fit in." Given increased competition for units, and
the economic instability of recent times, cooperative boards are de-
6. Id. "Four times the number of co-ops exist today than in 1982, and they sell
for $15,000 as well as $15 million." Id.
7. Stuart Moskowitz, Cooperative Apartments: The Enforceability of Transfer Re-
strictions and the Impact of Bankruptcy, 18 REAL EST. L.J. 142, 143 n.4 (1989); Robert
Nelson, Note, Examining Cooperative Conversion: An Analysis of Recent New York
Legislation, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1089, 1089 (1983)(citing OFFICE OF POLICY AND
DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
PUB. No. PB81-118234, THE CONVERSION OF RENTAL HOUSING TO CONDOMINIUMS
AND COOPERATIVES: A NATIONAL STUDY OF SCOPE, CAUSES AND IMPACTS: XI-1
(1980)).
8. E.g., Tracie Rozhan & N.R. Kleinfeld, Getting Into Co-ops: The Money Bias,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at Al; Peter Hellman, Co-op Board Hell, NEW YORK
MAG., Nov. 6, 1995, at 27; Jay Romano, Passing a Co-op Interview, N.Y. TIMES, July
30, 1995, § 9, at 5.
9. Note, The Rule of Law in Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472, 472
(1985)(citations omitted).
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manding more personal information from applicants and imposing
stricter social and financial qualifications. 10
Although there are no city-wide statistics on the percentage of
applications rejected by cooperative boards, realtors estimate that
the rejection rate is 5% or less." On its face, this rejection rate
seems low. The low estimate, however, does not necessarily mean
that unlawful' discrimination is absent from the co-op application
process. Real estate professionals suggest that the low rejection
rate results from applicants self-selecting buildings where they be-
lieve they are welcome. Real estate professionals also admit that
there is significant discriminatory steering by brokers who have
knowledge of where a particular applicant will "fit in."' 2 Without
this rigorous pre-screening of applicants, it is estimated that far
more applicants would be turned down.' 3
Anecdotal accounts of self-selection by applicants and discrimi-
natory steering are supported by statistical data. A recent series of
New York Times articles underscored the concern that a seemingly
low rejection rate by cooperative boards disguises a racial imbal-
ance that may be attributed to unlawful bias. For example, as illus-
trated in Table 1, the overwhelming majority of co-op owners in
New York City are white.
As demonstrated by the Tables 2 and 3, the underrepresentation
of minority groups in cooperative units is apparent even when con-
trolling for income levels across racial lines. In short, minority
group members are less likely to own cooperative apartments than
whites at all economic levels.
The New York State Court of Appeals has vested cooperative
boards with broad discretion concerning their decision-making.
Consequently, few rejected buyers file discrimination complaints
with government agencies or courts. A cooperative board's sweep-
10. Dee Wedemeyer, Co-ops Tighten Standards for Buyers, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
1984, § 8, at 1.
11. See Rozhon & Kleinfeld, supra note 8, at Al (reporting that the Corcoran
Group registered a turndown rate of 2.5% in 1995 and indicating that this percentage
is on the rise); Michael DeCourcy Hinds, When a Co-op Board Rejects a Buyer, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1986, § 8, at 1, 20 (indicating that few buyers rejected by co-op boards
challenge the decision).
12. There is an implicit acknowledgment among brokers that categories of unpop-
ular applicants for "restrictive" or "conservative" co-op buildings exist. For example,
unmarried women, gay and lesbian couples, families with children, lawyers and physi-
cians are some of the disfavored categories. Some brokers simply do not take these
applicants to such "restrictive" buildings. See Rozhan & Kleinfeld, supra note 8, at
Al.
13. Id.; Hinds, supra note 11, at 1; Iver Peterson, As Co-ops Spread, Discrimina-
tion Concerns Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1990, § 10, at 5.
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TABLE 1
RACE OR ETHNICITY ALL NYC HOUSEHOLDS NYC Co-op HOUSEHOLDS
White 48.4% 79.9%
Black 23.4% 6.3%
Hispanic 20.7% 7.4%
Asian 5.9% 5.2%
Other 1.6% 1.2%
Source: Tracie Rozhon & N.R. Kleinfeld, Getting into Co-ops: The Money Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at B2 (Chart citing Prof. Andrew A. Beveridge, Sociology
Department, CUNY at Queens College, from 1993 New York City Housing and
Vacancy Survey).
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF Co-op HOMEOWNERS
RACIAL OR ETHNIC IDENTITY WHO EARN BETWEEN $50,000 AND $99,999
White 30%
Black 14%
Hispanic 15%
Asian 15%
Source: Tracie Rozhon & N.R. Kleinfeld, Getting into Co-ops: The Money Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at B2 (citing Prof. Andrew A. Beveridge, Sociology
Department, CUNY at Queens College, from 1993 New York City Housing and
Vacancy Survey).
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF Co-op HOMEOWNERS
RACIAL OR ETHNIC IDENTITY WHO EARN BETWEEN $100,000 AND $199,999
White 44%
Black 11%
Hispanic 18%
Asian 27%
Source: Tracie Rozhon & N.R. Kleinfeld, Getting into Co-ops: The Money Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at B2 (Chart citing Prof. Andrew A. Beveridge, Sociology
Department, CUNY at Queens College, from 1993 New York City Housing and
Vacancy Survey).
ing powers, however, are not absolute. While it is true that cooper-
ative boards may reject applicants for any non-discriminatory
reason, or for no reason at all, the courts draw the line at civil-
rights violations. They will carefully evaluate challenged coopera-
tive board decisions to determine whether discrimination was a fac-
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tor. Given the low vacancy rate of housing units in the city, the
proliferation of co-ops, and the anecdotal and statistical evidence
supporting allegations of discrimination in the application process,
it is important to examine the power of cooperative boards to veto
the housing choices of New Yorkers.
IH. General Legal Parameters Applicable to Housing
Cooperatives and Board Decision-making
A. Overview of the Legal Foundation of Housing Cooperatives
Housing cooperatives are sui generis in nature.'4 Most housing
cooperatives are stock corporations 15 formed pursuant to the New
York Business Corporation Law, the Cooperative Corporation
Law or the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law.' 6 Under the stock
corporation structure, the cooperative holds title to the premises
and leases units to tenant-shareholders, who own shares in the co-
operative corporation.' 7
The certificate of incorporation, corporate by-laws and proprie-
tary lease provide the framework for the cooperative's operation
and governance.' 8 Housing cooperatives are self-governed by a
14. Alexy v. Kennedy House, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 690, 697 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Jones v.
O'Connell, 458 A.2d 355, 358 (Conn. 1983); Plaza Road Cooperative, Inc. v. Finn, 492
A.2d 1072, 1075 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); State Tax Comm'n v. Shor, 43
N.Y.2d 151, 154, 371 N.E.2d 523, 524, 400 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (1977); Chemical Bank v.
635 Park Avenue Corp., 155 Misc. 2d 433, 435, 588 N.Y.S. 2d 257, 258 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1992); Sanders v. Tropicana, 229 S.E.2d 304, 307-08 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976). See gener-
ally 2 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS:
HOUSING COOPERATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 1.01 (Bender 1995).
15. Nelson, supra note 7, at 1091; ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 14, § 1.01(3)(d);
Lawrence Nussbaum III, Transfer Restrictions on Cooperative Apartments: Tyrannical
Reins or Necessary Restraints?, 30 WASH U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 147, 150 (1986).
16. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. § 401 et seq.; N.Y. CooP. CORP. LAW § 10 et seq.; N.Y.
NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 401 et seq.; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e et seq.; see
also, Arthur E. Wallace, Comment, Restrictions on the Use of Cooperative Apartment
Property, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 357 (1962); Philip Smith, Comment, A Survey of the Legal
Aspects of Cooperative Apartment Ownership, 16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305 (1961); Note,
Cooperative Apartment Housing, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1407 (1948).
17. ROHAN & RESKIN, supra, note 14, § 1.01(1). There are alternative methods of
cooperative formation and structure. Under the co-ownership method, tenants are
co-owners of the building through joint tenancy or tenancy in common agreements,
and have exclusive occupancy rights. This form of ownership is extremely impractica-
ble. Id. § 1.01(3). Under the trust structure, a trust is established and title to the
building is transferred to the trust. A trustee may manage the building or hire a man-
ager. The trust declaration contains the provisions governing the co-op. Under this
arrangement, tenant-shareholders have lesser control over management. See Nuss-
baum, supra note 15, at 150 n.22; ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 14, at § 1.01(3).
18. The certificate of incorporation or corporate charter must be filed with the
state and is a prerequisite to the cooperative taking any action as a corporate entity.
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board of directors as established within the documents listed
above.'9 Boards have extensive control over both shareholder and
tenant rights.20 The board may be empowered to make decisions
covering a variety of co-op operations including budgets, mainte-
nance fees and exterior appearance standards.2'
The unique nature of cooperative ownership gives each tenant-
shareholder a financial interest in the corporate entity which owns
the building, but without ownership rights to an individual unit.
Thus, the shareholder interest in a housing cooperative does not fit
neatly into traditional categories of property ownership.22 Many
courts have discussed the "special nature" of cooperative owner-
ship, noting that shareholders do not technically own their apart-
ments, but do enjoy many of the benefits commonly associated
N.Y. Coop. CORP. LAW §§ 11, 16, 40. The corporate by-laws delineate the tenant-
shareholder's rights as well as the building's self-governance structure. ROHAN &
RESKIN, supra note 14, at § 1.04(6). The occupancy agreement or proprietary lease
defines the relationship between the corporation and tenant-shareholders and their
mutual rights and obligations. The cooperative's foundation documents are to be
read together in defining the contours of board power over shareholders. Fe Bland v.
Two Trees Management Co., 66 N.Y.2d 556, 489 N.E.2d 223, 498 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1985);
Chemical Bank, 155 Misc. 2d at 435, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 258-59 (citing All Seasons Re-
sorts, Inc. v. Abrams, 68 N.Y.2d 81, 497 N.E.2d 33, 506 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1986)).
19. See Note, An Exception to the Levandusky Business Judgment Rule: Owner
and Shareholder Interests in Condominium and Cooperative Board Decisions, 14 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 1021, 1022 (1993)[hereinafter Exception to the Levandusky Rule]; Mos-
kowitz, supra note 7, at 147 (discussing board power over the transfer of shares);
ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 14, at Ch. 9.
20. See Exception to the Levandusky Rule, supra note 19, at 1022; Levandusky v.
One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 536, 553 N.E.2d 1317, 1320, 554
N.Y.S.2d 807, 810 (1990):
[Tihe cooperative... association is a quasi government .... The proprietary
lessees... consent to be governed, in certain respects, by the decisions of a
board. Like a municipal government, such governing boards are responsible
for running the day-to-day affairs of the cooperative and to that end, often
have broad powers in areas that range from financial decisionmaking to
promulgating regulations regarding pets and parking spaces.
21. See Exception to the Levandusky Rule, supra note 19, at 1021-22 n.3; ROHAN &
RESKIN, supra note 14, at § 9.03(9)(a).
22. The nature of the shareholder's property interest is best described as a legal
hybrid of both personal and real property. For example, cooperative ownership has
been considered personal property in dispositions under a will, and real property
under financial securities law. For further discussion see Rohan & Reskin, supra note
14, at § 1.01(2) (citations omitted); Chemical Bank, 155 Misc. 2d at 436, 588 N.Y.S.2d
at 259; Harvey S. Epstein, Weisner Revisited: A Reappraisal of a Co-op's Power to
Arbitrarily Prohibit the Transfer of Its Shares, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 477, 491 (1986);
Note, Legal Characterization of the Individual's Interest in a Cooperative Apartment:
Realty or Personalty?, 73 COLUMBIA L. REV. 250, 260-64 (1973); Note, Cooperative
Apartments - A Legal Hybrid, 13 U. FLA. L. REV. 123, 128 (1960).
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with home ownership.23 For example, cooperative mortgage inter-
est payments and real estate taxes may be deducted from federal
taxes. In addition, shareholders build equity and may take out
home equity loans based on the value of their shares.24
The benefits of individual home ownership, however, are limited
by the web of financial interdependence that the cooperative own-
ership structure creates. At the heart of the shareholders' financial
interdependence is the common mortgage which financed the orig-
inal purchase of the structure.25 Each shareholder pays their pro
rata portion of the cooperative's mortgage payment through a
maintenance charge which bundles an array of co-op related ex-
penses into one monthly payment.26
The cooperative's ability to make mortgage payments depends
on each shareholder's ability to make timely maintenance pay-
ments.27 If one or more shareholders default, other shareholders
may be forced to make up the monetary difference.28 A continued
failure to cover shortfalls could lead to a foreclosure proceeding in
which shareholders lose their apartments or equity investment.
Thus, the ramifications of shareholder interdependence are
weighty, and potentially fatal to each shareholder's property inter-
est and occupancy rights.
The financial interdependence of shareholders is often cited as
the primary justification for the co-operatives' power to set re-
straints on the shareholders' right to sell shares.29 Courts have ac-
23. Shor, 43 N.Y.2d at 154, 371 N.E.2d at 524, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 806; People ex rel.
McGoldrick v. Sterling, 283 A.D. 88, 126 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1st Dep't 1953); Penthouse
Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Avenue, Inc., 256 A.D. 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1st Dep't
1939); California Coastal Comm'n v. Quanta Inv. Corp., 170 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1980); Carolyn S. Bratt, Cooperative Apartments: A Survey of Legal Treatment
and an Argument for Homestead Protection, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 761.
24. See California Coastal Comm'n, 170 Cal. Rptr. 263; Epstein, supra note 22, at
487 n.51; Bratt, supra, note 23.
25. ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 14, at § 5.01(2). See also Nelson, supra, note 7,
at 1092.
26. ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 14, at § 10.02(1)(a). In addition to the mort-
gage, the monthly assessment includes interest payments on the mortgage, capital out-
lays and operating expenses. The proprietary lease sets forth both the amount and
method of payment. See Nussbaum, supra note 15, at 153 n.53.
27. See Nussbaum, supra note 15, at 155 n.60; Moskowitz, supra note 7, at 148.
28. ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 14, at § 5.01(1). The remaining shareholders
contribute to coverage of shortfalls on a pro rata basis according to their number of
shares. The cooperative corporation may set up a contingency reserve in anticipation
of such a short fall. Id. § 5.01(1), n.4.
29. See Moskowitz, supra note 7, at 148. For further discussion of the financial
interdependence among shareholders, see Cooperative Apartment Housing, supra
note 16, at 1414-16.
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cepted co-op board oversight and control of the share transfer
process, including their right to reject applicants, and have under-
scored the importance of the prospective purchaser's ability to
meet co-op related financial obligations.3 ° The court in Mowatt v.
1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp.31 succinctly summarized this premise:
[U]ltimately the tenant-shareholders must bear all the costs of
the operation. If one tenant-shareholder fails to pay his shares,
the others must, as a practical matter, make up the difference.
There is, therefore, a direct and substantial economic interest in
the choice of new tenant-shareholders who are financially
responsible.32
Given the reality of financial interdependence, cooperative boards
also oversee the shareholder application process and have the ulti-
mate power to reject or accept applicants.33
B. Judicial Review of Co-op Board Decisions
The New York Court of Appeals decision in Levandusky v. One
Fifth Avenue Apartment Corp.3 4 gives cooperative boards broad
discretion to conduct their affairs without judicial intervention. Le-
vandusky applied a standard of review analogous to the business
judgment rule when the decisions of cooperative boards are chal-
lenged.35  Specifically, judicial review of board decisions is not
available when the board acts in good faith, within the scope of its
authority and in furtherance of the cooperative's interests.36 In
support of the standard, the court noted that:
30. See Weisner v. 791 Park Avenue Corp., 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190
N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959); Moskowitz, supra note 7, at 148; Richard Siegler, Refutation of a
Discrimination Claim: Greenhouse Repairs, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 3, 1996 at 3 [hereinafter
Siegler, Refutation].
31. 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967).
32. Id. at 137.
33. Id. Board oversight of the application process may be established by restrict-
ing the right to assign an apartment or sell corporate stock in the proprietary lease.
See Nussbaum, supra note 15, at 156-57; ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 14, at
§ 10.02(2). The by-laws and certificate of incorporation may also contain terms re-
quiring board approval for share transfers. Epstein, supra note 22, at 487 n.12 (cita-
tions omitted).
34. 75 N.Y.2d 530, 553 N.E.2d 1317, 554 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1990).
35. Id. at 537, 553 N.E.2d at 1321, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 811. In Levandusky, the co-op
board issued a "stop work" order to prevent the plaintiff-tenant from renovating his
apartment. Id. at 534, 553 N.E.2d at 1319, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 809. Litigation com-
menced when Levandusky filed an article 78 proceeding to annul the stop work order.
Id.
36. Id. at 538, 553 N.E.2d at 1322, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 812. In support of the deferen-
tial standard, the court noted that the proprietary lessees in a co-op consent to be
12531996]
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"courts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to eialuate
what are and must be essentially business judgments .... [B]y
definition the responsibility for business judgments must rest
with the corporate directors; their individual capabilities and ex-
perience peculiarly qualify them for the discharge of that
responsibility." 37
Based on these and other considerations, the court concluded that
the business judgment rule "best balances the individual and col-
lective interests at stake. ' 38 Thus, Levandusky virtually insulated
cooperative boards from judicial review in most aspects of board
decision-making.
While the rule enunciated in Levandusky enhanced co-op board
power in all aspects of property management, the court recognized
the potential for board abuse of their discretion "through arbitrary
and malicious decisionmaking, favoritism, discrimination and the
like. ' 39 The rule clearly does not prohibit review of board deci-
sions that are beyond the scope of the board's authority, made in
bad faith or discriminatory in nature:
Even when the governing board acts within the scope of its au-
thority, some check on its potential powers to regulate residents'
conduct, life-style and property rights is necessary to protect in-
40dividual residents from abusive exercise ....
governed by a board comprised of members whom they have selected. Id. at 537, 553
N.E.2d at 1321, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
37. Levandusky, 75 N.Y.2d at 539, 553 N.E.2d at 1322, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 812, quot-
ing Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-31, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 926-27 (1979).
38. Id. at 537, 553 N.E.2d at 1321, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 811. The court pointed to a
number of other courts, inside and outside of New York, that have adopted the same
standard of review for cooperatives and condominiums. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Holiday
Summer Homes, Inc., 143 A.D.2d 811, 533 N.Y.S.2d 144 (2d Dep't 1988); Schoninger
v. Yardarm Beach Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc., 134 A.D.2d 1, 523 N.Y.S.2d 523 (2d
Dep't 1987); Van Camp v. Sherman, 132 A.D.2d 453, 517 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1st Dep't
1987); Papalexiou v. Tower W. Condominium, 401 A.2d 280 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div.
1979); Schwarzmann v. Association of Apt. Owners of Bridgehaven, 655 P.2d 1177
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982); Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 526 P.2d 316 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974).
In adopting a standard analogous to the business judgment rule, the Court of Ap-
peals in Levandusky affirmatively rejected the reasonableness review applied below
by the appellate division and as applied by other courts theretofore. For an extensive
discussion of the reasonableness standard of review and comparison of that standard
with the business judgment rule, see generally Exception to the Levandusky Rule,
supra note 19.
39. Levandusky, 75 N.Y.2d at 536, 553 N.E.2d at 1320, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 810.
40. Id. at 537, 553 N.E.2d at 1321, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 811 (citing Note, The Rule of
Law in Residential Associations, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472 (1985)).
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Cooperative legal expert Richard Siegler surveyed twenty cases ap-
plying the Levandusky standard and concluded that Levandusky
has not led courts to simply "rubber stamp" cooperative board de-
cisions. On the contrary, courts have refused to enforce the deci-
sions of cooperative and condominium boards in about half of the
cases he surveyed.4'
C. Board Authority Over Share Transfers
The documents prescribing the relationship between coopera-
tives and its shareholders often restrict the transfer of the proprie-
tary lease and co-op shares by requiring the consent of the board of
directors prior to a transfer.42 While Levandusky provides a gen-
eral rule of judicial deference to cooperative board decisions, a
narrower line of case law defines the legal standards governing ad-
mission decisions. The courts began to define those legal standards
in 1939 when the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New
York decided Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Avenue, Inc. 4 3
In Penthouse Properties, the tenant-shareholder challenged the
validity of the cooperative's restriction on her ability to transfer
shares and assign her proprietary lease without the consent of the
board or two-thirds of the stockholders. The court upheld the re-
striction, stating that "the special nature of the ownership of co-
operative apartment houses by tenant owners require[s] that they
be not included in the general rule against restraints on the sale of
stock in corporations organized for profit. ' 44 Thus, Penthouse
Properties validated restraints on alienation in the cooperative
housing context, but did not pass judgment on whether a board
may arbitrarily withhold consent to the transfer of co-op shares.
Twenty years later, in Weisner v. 791 Park Avenue Corp.,4 the
Court of Appeals addressed directly the issue of whether consent
to transfer shares could be withheld arbitrarily. In Weisner, the
plaintiff challenged a provision in the proprietary lease requiring
that the tenant-shareholder not assign the lease or any interest
41. Richard Siegler, The Aftermath of Levandusky, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 2, 1994, at 3
(emphasis in original)[hereinafter Siegler, Aftermath].
42. Chemical Bank, 155 Misc. 2d at 435, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 259. That court noted
that such consent requirements have been upheld despite arguments that they are an
improper restraint on alienation. See Moskowitz, supra note 7, at 147; Nussbaum,
supra note 15, at 156-57; ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 14, at § 10.02(2) and App. D-
2.
43. 256 A.D.2d 685, 11 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1st Dep't 1939).
44. Id. at 692, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
45. 6 N.Y.2d 426, 160 N.E.2d 720, 190 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1959).
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therein without the written consent of the board of directors, a ma-
jority of directors, or the lessees of record owning at least two-
thirds of the corporation's stocks.46 Plaintiff wished to purchase
shares in the cooperative corporation and was refused the neces-
sary consent without explanation. The court upheld the board's
decision, concluding that absent a violation of an applicable anti-
discrimination statute there was
no reason why the owners of the cooperative apartment house
could not decide for themselves with whom they wish to share
their elevators, their common halls and furniture, their stock-
holder meetings, their management problems and responsibili-
ties and their homes. 7
Thus, the Weisner decision enhanced the cooperative board's dis-
cretion over share transfers by approving the arbitrary withholding
of consent by the board, absent a violation of discrimination laws.
IV. Applicable Anti-Discrimination Statutes
Weisner and Levandusky established that the cooperative's "cor-
porate veil" may be pierced when a cognizable claim is made pur-
suant to an anti-discrimination statute. As described below,
housing cooperatives are covered by a panoply of anti-discrimina-
tion statutes. At the federal level, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, its
1988 amendments, and the 1866 Civil Rights Act are the primary
providers of protection for shareholders. At the state level, sec-
tions of the Civil Rights Law, Executive Law and Real Property
Law combine to provide prospective tenant-shareholders with
broad coverage. In New York City, the Human Rights Law pro-
tects a wide range of classes from discrimination by cooperatives.
A brief overview of these statutes is provided in Table 4.
V. Anti-Discrimination Statutes Applied to
Housing Cooperatives
This Part will review cases which have applied anti-discrimina-
tion statutes to cooperatives. As will be discussed, some common
principles and trends can be culled from the cases. Equally appar-
ent, however, are the inconsistencies in approaches employed by
courts in deciding such cases.
Whether a cooperative's reason for rejecting an applicant is
based on objective or subjective factors affects the cooperative's
46. Id. at 431, 160 N.E.2d at 722, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 73.
47. Id. at 435, 160 N.E.2d at 724, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
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TABLE 4
STATUTORY PROTECTIONS AGAINST
DISCRIMINATION BY
HOUSING COOPERATIVES
SOURCE PROTECTED CLASSES COMMENTS
Federal Fair Housing Act of 1968
and 1988 amendments, 42 U.S.C.
§ 3601 et seq. ("Title VIII")
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981-82
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000(d) ("Title VI") **
New York State Executive Law
§ 296(5)(a)(1)
New York State Civil Rights Law,
§ 19-a(1)
New York State Real Property Law
§ 235-f
New York City Human Rights Law
§ 8-101 et seq.
Race, color, religion, national origin,
gender, disability, family status
Race
Race, color, national origin, sex
Race, creed, color, national origin,
sex, disability, marital status
Race, creed, national origin, sex
All classes
Race, creed, color, national origin,
gender, age, disability, sexual orien-
tation, marital status, alienage, citi-
zenship status, occupation or
because children would reside with
the occupant
Statute provides private right of
action. 1988 amendments created
complaint investigation and adjudica-
tion structure within the Department
of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment. Punitive damages limited to
$1,000.
Coverage limited to race and possi-
bly ethnicity and national origin.
Unlimited punitive damages.*
Prohibits discrimination by any pro-
gram or entity receiving federal
funds.
Applicability to co-ops is questiona-
ble.*** Provides for private right of
action. The New York State Divi-
sion of Human Rights investigates
and adjudicates housing discrimina-
tion complaints.
Statute applicable to cooperatives
only.
Known as the "roommate" law; it
prohibits landlord from restricting
occupancy of residential premises to
tenant or tenants and their immedi-
ate family.
Provides for private right of action.
The New York City Commission on
Human Rights investigates and adju-
dicates housing discrimination com-
plaints. Broad range of relief
available.
* For a broader discussion of the independence of and differences between Title VIII and the Civil Rights Act of 1866
see JAMES A. KUSHNER, FAIR HOusING: DIsCRMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, CoMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND REV]-
TAUZATION § 1.05 (2d ed. 1995); ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUsING DISCRIMINATION LAW 304-05 (1983).
** In Emil v. Dewey, 66 A.D.2d 758, 411 N.Y.S.2d 865 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (mem.), affd on other grounds, 49
N.Y.2d 968, 406 N.E.2d 744, 428 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1980), the plaintiff asserted claims under the state Executive Law and
Civil Rights Law. The First Department dismissed the claim holding that Civil Rights Law § 19-a does not cover
marital status. The Court of Appeals affirmed the outcome based on the plaintiff's violation of the administrative
scheme set forth in the Executive Law, but did not comment on the applicability of Executive Law § 296 to coopera-
tives.
Executive Law § 292(10) defines "housing accommodation" to include "any building, structure ... intended,
arranged, designed or to be used or occupied as the home, residence or sleeping place of one or more human beings."
Thus, it is quite clear that this definition would encompass cooperatives, despite the First Department's pronounce-
ment in Emil. Subsequent case law has been inconsistent. See, e.g., 66-36 Yellowstone Blvd. Co-op Owners, Inc., 599
F. Supp. 79, 80 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (granting plaintiff in co-op race discrimination case recovery under state executive
law and federal law); Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants Corp., 579 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (applying executive law
to cooperative, but holding that plaintiffs failed to establish claim); Bachman v. State Div. of Human Rights, 104
A.D.2d 111, 481 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (applying both Civil Rights Law §19-a and Executive Law
§ 296(2-a) to publicly assisted housing cooperative). Bt see Pardy v. Fountainhead Owners Corp., N.Y. LJ., Oct. 2,
1985, at 14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (dismissing plaintiff's claim that cooperative rejected his application based on his daughter's
young age on the grounds that such discrimination not covered by Civil Rights Law).
*** Other potential sources of federal protection include the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See,
e.g., Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970); Swann v.
Gastonia Hous. Auth., 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982). See SCHWEMM, supra note *, at 333; KUSHNER, supra note *, at
§ 1.07.
Also, Executive Order 11,063, as amended, forbids discrimination based on race, religion, national origin or sex in.
housing that is owned, operated or assisted by the federal government. Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652, 653
(1959-1963), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994). See KUSHNER, supra note *, § 1.03.
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ability to defeat a plaintiff's discrimination claim. In general,
greater judicial deference is given to board decisions based on ob-
jective factors. The most commonly invoked objective factor is the
prospective purchaser's inadequate finances.4 8 On the other hand,
reliance on subjective factors usually triggers more intense judicial
scrutiny and hinders the cooperative's chances for success.
A. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty
The seminal case applying anti-discrimination laws to housing
cooperatives is Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc.,' 9 in which the
Second Circuit outlined the legal framework for analyzing cooper-
ative board decisions. The plaintiff in Robinson was a black pro-
spective purchaser who was rejected by the defendant cooperative
despite being financially qualified. Plaintiff sought preliminary and
permanent injunctions permitting him to purchase shares in the
cooperative. °
The defendant cooperative did not dispute plaintiff's financial
qualifications. Instead, the cooperative justified its decision to re-
ject plaintiff based on what the court described as subjective fac-
tors. For example, despite plaintiff's vehement denials, the
defendant relied on rumors that the plaintiff planned to use the
apartment as an after hours club and put plumbing lines through
another shareholder's ceiling. The court found these defenses non-
credible and concluded that "a Fair Housing Act claim cannot be
defeated by a defendant which relies on merely hypothetical rea-
sons for the plaintiff's rejection."51 Some board members also
cited plaintiff's alleged hostility, arrogance and uncooperative be-
havior as a basis for the rejection.52 The court also found these
proffered reasons to be insufficient.
In holding for plaintiffs, the court's legal analysis focused on the
plaintiff's objective qualifications and on eliminating subjective
non-discriminatory reasons as the basis for his rejection.53 Accord-
48. See Part V.B.1, infra, for a discussion of plaintiff's financial qualifications.
49. 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979).
50. The plaintiff brought the action under the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982. The
plaintiff's claim under § 1982 was dismissed because he failed to plead or prove that
he was a U.S. citizen as required by the statute.
51. Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1040.
52. Id. at 1034-36.
53. See Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing
Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (11th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021
(1974)):
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ingly, the court placed great weight on plaintiff's objective qualifi-
cations to purchase the apartment. The court defined "qualified"
to mean "financially qualified" within the context of establishing a
prima facie case. 4 It did not consider any of the more subjective
factors, such as the plaintiff's prospective compatibility with other
shareholders, in assessing whether he was qualified. Instead, the
court relied solely on plaintiff's finances.
To determine whether a defendant's justification for a rejection
is a pretext for discrimination, Robinson instructs courts to "care-
fully scrutinize suggested reasons which are not objective in na-
ture."55 Courts are to look for explanations that are "subtle" and
"synthetic," and they should also be "especially chary of permitting
a [cooperative] to prevent, on the basis of easily fabricated subjec-
tive factors, a sale of housing by a willing seller to an objectively
acceptable buyer."' 56 The court stated that it would be especially
relevant to determine whether such proffered reasons would have
been sufficient to reject a white applicant. 7
Finally, the court stated that even if some or all of defendant's
reasons are genuine, "race need not be the sole motivating factor
in a denial that has a discriminatory effect in order for the plaintiff
to succeed in a Title VIII claim. '58 In fact, a court must hold that
[W]here a black rental applicant meets the objective requirements of a land-
lord, and the rental would likely have been consummated were he or she a
white applicant, a prima facie inference of discrimination arises as a matter
of law. If the inference is not satisfactorily explained away, discrimination is
established.
54. The plaintiff in Robinson produced circumstantial evidence in support of the
discrimination claim. When a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence a prima facie
case must be established to build an inference of discrimination. The elements of the
prima facie case are:
1. plaintiff is a member of a protected class;
2. plaintiff applied for and was qualified to rent or purchase the housing;
3. plaintiff was rejected; and
4. the housing opportunity remained available.
Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1038 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802 (1973)).
55. Id. at 1040.
56. Id. at 1043.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1042. In other words, Title VIII is violated if race is even one of the
motivating factors. Id. (citing Williams, 499 F.2d at 826; United States v. Pelzer Re-
alty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Smith v. Sol D.
Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1970); Wang v. Lake Maxinhall Es-
tates, Inc., 531 F.2d 832, 836, n.12 (7th Cir. 1976); Bishop, 431 F.Supp. at 37; Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. at 265-66). For further
analysis of the defendant's burden as set forth in Robinson, see Richard Siegler,
Apartment Transfers, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 3, 1990, at 1, 3.
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''racial motivation did not play any role in the decision" to find for
defendant.59
B. Objective Factors as Justification for Rejections by Co-ops
As noted above, the honest assertion of objective factors is the
surest defense for cooperatives facing discrimination charges.
While there is no finite set of objective factors to be culled from co-
op discrimination cases, in Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants Corp.,6°
the Southern District of New York provided a general list of objec-
tive factors including the following:
a) financial responsibility;
b) the legality of the proposed use; and
c) nature of the occupancy.61
The court noted that "[b]y contrast, reasons based on the land-
lord's supposed needs, dislikes, personal taste, sensibility, or con-
venience generally result in judicial disapproval. ' 62 A review of
the relevant case law reveals that the applicants' financial responsi-
bility is very often at the crux of the dispute.
1. Plaintiffs Financial Qualifications
The financial status of an applicant is of utmost concern to a co-
operative because of the financial interdependence of co-op share-
holders.63 Thus, the demonstration of a sound financial condition
almost always opens the door for an applicant. However, even co-
operative decisions based on a candidate's financial qualifications
can be tainted with unlawful bias. Courts recognize that un-
59. Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1048.
60. 579 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). These factors were listed in the context of
determining what would constitute an unreasonable withholding of consent to trans-
fer cooperative shares pursuant to the cooperative's by-laws.
61. Id. at 1156 (citing Kruger v. Page Management Co., Inc., 105 Misc. 2d 14, 23,
432 N.Y.S.2d 295, 302 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
While the factors listed in Murphy may provide some insight, the characterization
of at least one of the factors as objective is questionable. The "identity" or "business
character" of an applicant, which was also tested by the court, may be more subjective
than objective, particularly to the extent that such a determination depends on the
"suitability" of the applicant as indicated by the court. This kind of factor is precisely
the type that the Robinson court viewed with skepticism and subjected to rigorous
scrutiny.
62. Murphy, 579 F. Supp. at 1156 (citing Kruger, 105 Misc. 2d at 23, 432 N.Y.S.2d
at 302; Lapidus v. Melohn Properties, No. 6917/82, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 27,
1982); and Solow Management v. Kirchener, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 13, 1982, at 14 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1982).
63. See supra part III-A (discussing the financial interdependence between coop-
erative shareholders).
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founded suspicions and shifting standards based on negative ste-
reotypes may tip the scales of a board's decision-making process
against a minority applicant.
Some courts have responded by looking beyond a board's prof-
fered reasons, even when objective in nature, to ensure that dis-
crimination was not a factor in establishing criteria, applying
standards, or making decisions. The following cases demonstrate
the spectrum of approaches courts have taken in assessing the role
unlawful bias played in a co-op's decision to reject an applicant.
As demonstrated, the approaches range from rubber-stamping the
cooperative's assessment, to undertaking a de novo review of the
decision.
a. Overturning a Co-op's Rejection of an Applicant
In the well-known case of Rogers v. 66-36 Yellowstone Blvd. Co-
operative Owners, Inc.,64 the court flatly rejected the co-op board's
asserted financial reasons for denying the plaintiff's application. In
Rogers, the black plaintiff's application to purchase a $49,250
apartment was rejected on the grounds that she did not meet the
board's financial qualifications despite her teaching salary and net
worth in excess of $500,000.65
The defendant's articulated concern was the "source" of plain-
tiff's wealth, i.e., "how could she-on a teacher's pay-accumulate
such assets. ' 66 Although not explicitly discussed in these terms, the
basis for defendant's rejection seems to have been the board's dis-
belief that a black woman like the plaintiff could have accumulated
such wealth legitimately. The jury rejected this defense and con-
cluded that the board's suspicion about the source of plaintiff's
wealth was motivated at least in part by her race. The Court ruled
that the jury verdict was consistent with the evidence.
In Rogers, the indisputable fact that plaintiff could objectively
afford a relatively modest housing unit, given her salary and assets,
raised a red flag warranting closer scrutiny of the board's decision.
The closer scrutiny revealed "flagrant racial discrimination" and
prevented the board from hiding racial bias behind a seemingly ob-
jective consideration.67
Rogers instructs that if an applicant clearly is able to absorb the
purchase price and future flow of expenses, a co-op's unsubstanti-
64. 599 F. Supp. 79 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
65. Id. at 80.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 83.
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ated skepticism about the source of an applicant's wealth will be
subject to searching scrutiny. If such skepticism is unsupported by
a valid rationale, the likely result will be a decision for the plaintiff.
It is important to note that the record in Rogers revealed no evi-
dence supporting a finding that plaintiff acquired her wealth
through illegal means or that the assets were not lawfully hers. In
fact, plaintiff explained her good fortune, noting that she had
bought real estate when prices and interest rates were low. De-
fendants, however, dismissed this explanation without substantia-
tion. This supported a finding that the rejection was based on
suspicions sparked by plaintiff's race.
Rives v. 164 23rd St. Jackson Heights, Inc.68 also illustrates how
rigorous judicial scrutiny of a cooperative's assessment of an appli-
cant's finances can uncover discrimination. In Rives, the New York
City Commission on Human Rights found respondent's argument
that a Hispanic applicant was not "financially qualified" to be a
pretext for their unlawful bias.69
The tribunal disagreed with the board's assessment of the com-
plainant's finances and undertook its own analysis of the following
facts. Complainant wished to purchase a $145,400 unit, agreeing by
contract to put down $75,400 and to finance $70,000 through a
mortgage. 70 The complainant's average annual income as an archi-
tect had been $51,800 over the course of three years.71 In addition,
he had liquid savings of approximately $108,000.72 Applying gen-
eral banking standards and the board's own requirements, the tri-
bunal held that complainant "was financially qualified to purchase
the apartment for the agreed on price."' 73 Thus, the tribunal in
Rives did not defer to the cooperative's assessment of the pur-
chaser's finances, but instead undertook a de novo review.
Board members testified to an array of finance-related factors
for rejecting complainant's application. Their reasons, however,
were rejected by the tribunal in light of the complainant's strong
financial qualifications and the unlawful bias exhibited by the
68. Compl. No. H-92-0115, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (July 31, 1995), adopted as modified,
Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Sept. 28, 1995).
69. Id. at 13.
70. Id. at 6.
71. See id. at 14.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 13 (Complainant offered to make a down payment that exceeded 50% of
the purchase price, while the Board required only 25% at the time. Id. at 14. Also,
the tribunal stated that the Complainant's annual co-op related expenses would not
exceed 20% of his annual income-well below the general banking standard of 28%.
Id.).
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board president. As in Rogers, unsubstantiated suspicion over the
source of the applicant's accumulated wealth played a role in the
rejection. In Rives, the board president's demeanor and testimony
at the hearing led the tribunal to conclude that she voted to reject
complainant because of her unfounded concerns that the Hispanic
male complainant's liquid assets of over $100,000 were derived
from involvement in the drug trade.74 Thus, the tribunal found that
the rejection for financial reasons was unsound speculation fueled
by bias.
In Shoyinka v. 120 25th Street Jackson Heights, Inc.,75 the tribu-
nal itself undertook a rigorous analysis of complainant's finances.
In Shoyinka, the complainant was a white woman alleging that she
had been rejected unlawfully by the respondent cooperative be-
cause her children were black. The tribunal rejected the coopera-
tive's defense that complainant was financially unqualified, based
in part on an unusual and disturbing admission that at least one
board member had rejected complainant based on her children's
race. The board member explained her first vote to reject at her
deposition:
[Plaintiff] came in by herself and sat down, and she started talk-
ing. It wasn't but a few minutes till one of the board members
came in with the children. We were so shocked. They were
colored, but we didn't say anything about it. So when it came to
vote, we voted against her at that time .... They were colored
children and we knew nothing about it, and that seemed strange
to us. So we voted against her the very first time.
We have no colored people at all, no. We don't even have a
colored superintendent .... We have a white garbage man, and
we don't have any colored people at all, no .... That would be
the only place we could have them, as a superintendent, take out
the garbage and look after things .... 76
Acknowledging that this direct evidence of unlawful bias was
sufficient to support a finding of discrimination, the tribunal chose
to undertake its own assessment of complainant's finances and con-
cluded that she could handle the $70,000 purchase price, $402
monthly maintenance costs and a 50% down payment. 77 The tribu-
nal supported its conclusion with a finding that the complainant
74. Rives, Rec. Dec. & Ord. at 18.
75. Compl. No. FH-139061687-DH, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (Sept. 22, 1989), adopted,
Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Dec. 21, 1989).
76. Id. at 31-32.
77. Id. at 10.
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had an annual salary of $24,317, various bank and annuity accounts
worth $46,000, several IRAs worth $10,000, and was awaiting the
transfer of $20,000 to her accounts.78 The tribunal noted that the
combined costs of her maintenance fees and mortgage would only
be slightly higher than her current rent, which she had no difficulty
paying.
All board members who testified at the administrative hearing
cited complainant's finances as the reason for the rejection. The
tribunal discounted the respondents' testimony, however, stating
that "there was a unique and consistent inability to correctly re-
count anything about complainant Shoyinka's finances or the co-op
standards which caused them to exercise a rare vote of disap-
proval. '79 In short, the board's muddled explanation of its decision
resulted in the loss of its credibility before the tribunal.8 0
Similarly, the court in Irizarry v. 120 W. 70th Owners Corp.81
discredited the defendant cooperative's finance-based rejection of
the plaintiffs. In Irizarry, the plaintiffs, a Hispanic male and white
woman engaged to be married, submitted a joint application to
purchase shares for a $276,000 unit.82 Plaintiffs were rejected by
the co-op board despite their compliance with the sale contract
which required them to put 10% of the purchase price in escrow
and to secure a 60% mortgage commitment.83
Plaintiffs asked for reconsideration, confirming their plans to get
married and emphasizing that one plaintiff had just acquired over
$255,000 from the sale of a building.8 Plaintiffs also offered; to
place an additional $50,000 in escrow to assure performance of
their obligations under the primary leasehold agreement, or in the
alternative, to pay an additional $50,000 in cash toward the
purchase price, thus reducing the mortgage. The board simply
78. Id.
79. Id. at 8.
80. The tribunal also pointed to the financial qualifications of those previously
accepted applicants, who had submitted applications with "no more impressive fi-
nances" than complainant. The fact that previously accepted white applicants had
roughly equivalent financial data supported plaintiff's claims that they were victims of
discrimination. Id.
81. No. 86 Civ. 3503, 1986 WL 8073 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1986).
82. Id. at *1-2. Plaintiffs were engaged when they submitted their application.
Mr. Irizarry is of Puerto Rican descent.
83. Id. at *2-3.
84. Id. at *3.
85. Id. The letter to the board containing the terms also outlined some of plaintiff
Mauceri's projected future earnings as an actress. Mr. Irizarry was a sergeant in the
New York City Police Department. Id.
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confirmed their prior rejection, again citing to plaintiffs' failure to
meet financial qualifications.
After finding that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case
of discrimination, the court rejected the cooperative's defense.
Without further analysis or review of related facts beyond those set
forth above, the court concluded "that there is no doubt that plain-
tiffs qualify financially to purchase the unit in question and that
this financial ability was demonstrated in the application docu-
ments... no reasonable explanation [exists] for plaintiffs' rejection
.... "I Thus, the court found that the defendant's rationale was a
pretext for national origin discrimination and ordered the defend-
ant to approve plaintiffs' application.87
The Irizarry court gave little deference to the cooperative's de-
termination that plaintiffs were financially unqualified. It flatly re-
jected defendant's view of plaintiffs' finances without undertaking
its own analysis to demonstrate precisely how plaintiffs were quali-
fied. The court may have taken this dismissive approach in part
because plaintiffs' financial qualifications were strong enough on
their face to make a detailed analysis unnecessary. Irrizarry under-
scores the willingness of some courts to reject a cooperative's deci-
sion-making, even when objective factors are relied upon.
In at least one instance, a court has assessed plaintiff's financial
qualifications where there was no original assessment by the coop-
erative. In Pinchback v. Armistead Homes Corp. ,88 the plaintiff de-
cided not to submit an application to the defendant cooperative
after a real estate agent informed her that it was defendant's policy
not to accept blacks. The court, after finding the plaintiff qualified,
held for plaintiff, invoking the futile gesture theory.89 The defend-
ants had made no financial assessment of the plaintiff's finances
because the plaintiff had never applied. However, the court as-
sessed the plaintiff's financial qualifications because to succeed
under the futile gesture theory, a party must be qualified.
86. Irizarry, 1986 WL 8073 at *6.
87. Id. at *7.
88. 689 F. Supp. 541 (D. Md. 1988), affd in part, vacated in part, 907 F.2d 1447
(4th Cir. 1990).
89. In elaborating on the futile gesture theory, the Pinchback court quoted liber-
ally from the Supreme Court's decision in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). "When a person's desire for a job is not translated
into a formal application solely because of his unwillingness to engage in a futile ges-
ture he is as much a victim of discrimination as is he who goes through the motions of
submitting an application." Pinchback, 689 F. Supp. at 552.
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The court's financial analysis consisted of comparing the
purchase price and down payment requirement to the plaintiff's fu-
ture income stream. The plaintiff demonstrated a monthly income,
when combined with her husband's income, of more than four
times the projected mortgage payment.90 The court did not discuss
the plaintiff's savings or debt with respect to the plaintiff's ability to
make the down payment, but noted that a friend of the plaintiff
had offered financial assistance.91 After this rather cursory review,
the court found the plaintiff to be qualified.
The willingness of the courts and tribunals in Rogers, Rives,
Shoyinka, Irizarry, and Pinchback to undertake a de novo review
of plaintiff's finances and reach conclusions contrary to those of
cooperative boards demonstrates that the discrimination exception
to the Levandusky rule is not hollow. It establishes that at least
some courts will attempt to smoke out unlawful discrimination
from behind the screen of a plaintiff's allegedly deficient financial
qualifications.
b. Judicial Deference to Cooperative Decisions
In some cases courts have deferred to co-op boards after under-
taking a more limited analysis of plaintiff's finances. For example,
in Concord Village Owners, Inc. v. City of New York Commission
on Human Rights,92 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York deferred to the cooperative's assessment of complain-
ant's finances in a decision which overturned the findings of the
Commission on Human Rights.
The court's limited deference in this case seems to have been
triggered by complainants' own admission of their financial ineligi-
bility and by the administrative law judge's finding of the same.
Complainants, an unmarried couple who alleged discrimination
based on their marital status, admitted that they lacked the funds
necessary to close the deal when they appeared before the co-op's
admission committee. 93 Complainants planned to make up the sev-
eral-thousand-dollar shortfall by the time of closing through means
such as making an early withdrawal from a pension fund, obtaining
a loan from a parent, and saving future paychecks. 94 In addition to
90. Id. at 549-50.
91. Id.
92. 199 A.D.2d 388, 605 N.Y.S.2d 314 (2d Dep't 1993).
93. Id. at 389, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
94. Id.
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their being undercapitalized, complainants' income was dependant
on short-term government grants.
The cooperative did not accept complainants' plan and remained
skeptical of their future ability to pay co-op related expenses. The
court accepted the board's skepticism as a sound basis for rejection
and described complainants' plan to meet the financial demands of
the transaction as speculative. The court, however, did not accept
defendant's reasoning without some analysis. On the contrary, it
discussed each element of the rejection and even compared com-
plainants' application with that of other applicants. After its analy-
sis, the court concluded that the cooperative need not accept an
applicant's predictions of income sources when that applicant does
not have the ability to cover the purchase price and expenses at the
time of the application. 95
The court was correct to scrutinize the cooperative's rationale
because an applicant's ability to meet future expenses can almost
never be determined with objective certainty. In agreeing that
complainants were unqualified, the court ultimately deferred to the
board's decision finding that defendant's assertion that complain-
ants' future finances were uncertain was substantiated.
By contrast, in Ikegami v. 40 W. 24th St. Corp. 96 the court ac-
cepted wholesale the defendant co-op's negative assessment of the
plaintiffs' finances. With little analysis, the court denied plaintiffs'
claim that they were rejected based on their race and marital sta-
tus, and concurred with the board's conclusion that they were not
able to meet objective financial requirements.97
In support of its conclusion, the court essentially regurgitated the
testimony of board members in summary fashion. It stated that
various board members were concerned because co-op related ex-
penses would consume more than 30% of the purchaser's gross in-
come. In addition, plaintiffs were obligated to pay a mortgage on a
country home, and the $50,000 cash down payment did not appear
to be readily available to them.98 Rather than subjecting defend-
ants' conclusions to scrutiny, the court emphasized the defendants'
credibility and the heterogeneous composition of the cooperative
building's residents. The court concluded that plaintiffs' rejection
95. Id.
96. No. 84 Civ. 3990, 1984 WL 633 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1984).
97. Id. at *1.
98. Id.
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was grounded in the good-faith belief of the defendant concerning
plaintiffs' finances.99 Thus, plaintiffs' claim failed.
As illustrated by the next two decisions, courts are more likely to
be deferential to cooperative decisions based on financial criteria
that are fixed and objective rather than general conclusions about
an applicant's finances. When a cooperative's standards are quan-
tifiable, courts are apt to consider simply whether a purchaser met
the specific criteria. 100 It is unlikely that a court would undertake
an independent analysis of the reasonableness of the financial stan-
dard or its application. This is a reasonable approach given the
difficulty of considering an applicant's membership in a protected
class when applying a set, uniform standard such as a minimum
salary requirement. It is also consistent with the general rule of
deference set by Levandusky.
For example, in Jimenez v. Southridge Cooperative Section I,
Inc.,10 the cooperative asserted that plaintiff, who alleged discrimi-
nation based on race, color and national origin, failed to meet two
of its criteria: first, continuous employment by the same employer
for a one-year period; and second, a minimum of $30,000 in as-
sets.10 2 The court accepted the cooperative's rationale for rejecting
the plaintiff's application. Plaintiff admitted that his financial qual-
ifications as listed in his first application were insufficient, but
submitted an amended second application which, in his view,
demonstrated that he was financially qualified.
The court essentially ignored plaintiff's amended application.
After reviewing only the factual evidence of plaintiff's employment
history, the court accepted defendant's disputed contention that
the plaintiff had not been with his current employer for one year as
justification for rejecting the plaintiff's application. The court did
not comment on the relevancy of the one-year criteria to an appli-
cant's fitness. Instead, it noted plaintiff's acknowledgment that he
was bound by the original application's terms disqualifying appli-
cants who withheld material information.
99. Il
100. See generally Siegler, Refutation, supra note 30, at 3.
101. 626 F. Supp. 732 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). The decision concerned plaintiffs request
for a preliminary injunction.
102. lId at 734. The court also noted as a third reason that the defendant favored a
competing applicant.
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In Zea v. Einschlag,10 3 the New York City Commission on
Human Rights also deferred to the cooperative's standards for de-
termining whether a prospective purchaser was qualified. At issue
was the co-op's minimum income requirement for applicants,
which excluded income from a second full- or part-time job from
the calculation.1°4 Complainant, a divorced mother, challenged her
rejection by arguing that the co-op should have included the child-
support payments she received each month in determining whether
she met the minimum income requirement.
The tribunal accepted the co-op's conclusion that the plaintiff
was not financially qualified, thus implicitly accepting the co-op's
standards regarding minimum income and rejecting any arguments
that such standards had a disparate impact upon a protected class.
In fact, the tribunal strongly defended the cooperative's decision to
assess the applicant's finances as it did, displaying a level of defer-
ence surpassing previously discussed decisions. The fact that the
standards were quantifiable and fixed contributed greatly to the tri-
bunal's deference.
In sum, the cases discussed above illustrate the varying levels of
scrutiny applied by courts when considering a cooperative pur-
chaser's financial qualifications. Some courts look to a few simple
benchmarks that may not reveal the entirety of plaintiff's financial
picture. 10 5 Other courts are more rigorous and thorough, and em-
ploy objective, widely accepted standards for assessing a party's fi-
nancial condition.
The variety of approaches concerning plaintiff's finances is
matched by the disparity in deference shown by courts to co-op
boards. As demonstrated, some courts willingly disagree with the
cooperative's assessment, demonstrating little or no deference to
the cooperative's potential expertise in determining who is finan-
cially able to purchase shares. Other courts barely question the
cooperative's analysis, perhaps implicitly taking heed of the Le-
vandusky rule 10 6 of deference to board decisions. Although the va-
103. Compl. No. 557120690-DN, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (Apr. 26, 1993), vacated and
remanded, Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Sept. 30, 1993), Rec. Dec. & Ord. on Remand
(Nov. 23, 1993), adopted, Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. May 26, 1994).
104. Id. at 5.
105. In Sassower v. Field, 752 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the court found plain-
tiffs qualified based on the simple fact that they had received a mortgage commit-
ment. Such a superficial inquiry, though generally revealing of an applicant's
financial standing, is a poor substitute for a more thorough consideration of the coop-
erative's assessment or a de novo type review.
106. See supra part III-B for a discussion of Levandusky.
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riation can lead to inconsistent and therefore unpredictable results,
each court's approach seems to have been triggered by the reason-
ableness of the cooperative's decision and the objectivity of the cri-
teria applied.
2. Prior Acceptance of Other Protected Class Members as a
Defense
In some cases, defendant cooperatives have cited the presence of
other protected class members who have already been accepted as
a defense to an allegation of discrimination. Their rationale is that
a cooperative's acceptance of protected class members in the past
is evidence that it does not discriminate. The presence of protected
class members in a cooperative usually can be determined with ob-
jective certainty, but whether this translates into a general non-dis-
crimination policy is more difficult to assess. Thus, it is not
surprising that courts have taken differing views of this defense.
In Ikegami v. 40 W. 24th Street Corp.,1°7 the court held that the
racial and ethnic make-up of the cooperative as a whole was "not
without significance," in evaluating plaintiffs' claim that they were
discriminated against based on the fact that one plaintiff was Japa-
nese and that they were an unmarried couple. 10 8 The court noted
that the current shareholders included a Japanese man and unmar-
ried couples and that "[a] more heterogeneous group is difficult to
imagine."' 10 9 The court described the residents as a group including
"persons of all races, creeds and colors, as well as married and un-
married couples, both heterosexual and homosexual.., a Japanese
man, a Filipino woman living with a Caucasian man, an Israeli, and
a Puerto Rican." 110 The court rejected the plaintiffs' discrimination
claims based on the totality of the evidence, citing the diversity
within the cooperative as a factor."'
In Kirkpatrick v. 60 Sutton Corp.,11 the cooperative presented
evidence that there were homosexuals and same-sex couples living
in the cooperative as proof that they would not exclude gays or
persons with AIDS. The New York City Commission on Human
Rights considered evidence of the cooperative's prior acceptance
107. No. 84 Civ. 3990, 1984 WL 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
108. Id. at *1.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *1-2.
112. Compl. No. FH-164032991-DN, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (Oct. 30, 1992), adopted as
modified, Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Dec. 21, 1992), appeal withdrawn, 622 N.Y.S.2d
409 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't 1994).
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of persons from the complainant's minority group as "some proof
in Respondent's favor," but it was not enough to prevent a finding
for the complainant. The court noted that the gay Complainant did
not have to prove that all homosexuals were rejected based on
their status, but "need only prove that his application was held to a
higher standard based on membership in a protected class.) 113
Thus, the tribunal underscored the importance of an individualized
review in discrimination cases.
In Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc.," 4 the Second Circuit also
implicitly underscored the importance of an individualized review.
In Robinson, the defendant cooperative offered evidence that
some blacks had been subtenants or guests in the building in the
past. In a footnote, the court stated that this evidence had "some
relevance" concerning the defendant's motivation. However, the
defendant's "willingness to have Blacks in the building on short-
term bases does not dispose of the contention that the corporation
was motivated by racial considerations in acting to prevent a sale"
to the black plaintiff.115
In Rives v. 164 23rd Street Jackson Heights, Inc.,116 the New York
City Commission on Human Rights held that the prior acceptance
of a Latina was not a "proper backdrop of comparison for deter-
mining whether Respondents are inclined to discriminate against
[the Complainant, a single Latino male].""' 7 The tribunal stated
that the prior acceptance of a Latina established that the coopera-
tive's bias manifested itself only under certain circumstances."18
The middle ground tread by courts in weighing this defense is
warranted given the complicated state of race relations and the
often inconclusive nature of the defense. Anecdotal evidence es-
tablishes that certain buildings may 'accept a limited number of
protected class members, but stop at a set point for fear of "tipping
the balance." Given this problem, an individualized determination
of the relevance of such a defense to a discrimination claim is
critical." 9
113. Id. at 28.
114. 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979).
115. Id. at 1039 n.12.
116. Compl. No. H-92-0115, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (July 31, 1995), adopted as modified,
Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Sept. 28, 1995).
117. Id. at 22 n.13.
118. Id.
119. For further analysis of the "Other Minorities" defense, see Siegler, Refutation,
supra note 30, at 3 (discussion of unnamed case).
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C. Subjective Factors as Justification for Rejections by
Cooperatives
Weisner and Levandusky bestowed on cooperative boards the
authority to reject prospective purchasers for virtually any subjec-
tive, non-discriminatory reason. Based on this authority, coopera-
tive boards may consider subjective factors such as their needs,
dislikes, and personal tastes when evaluating applicants.
However, cooperative boards must be aware that the assertion
of a subjective factor as a defense to a discrimination claim almost
always triggers a rigorous judicial review.' 20 Robinson v. 12 Lofts
Realty, Inc.12 1 and its progeny advocate careful scrutiny of subjec-
tive factors because they are easy to use as a smoke screen for un-
lawful bias. As recognized by the Robinson court, without such
safeguards, "[a]ny defendant can respond to a discriminatory effect
with a claim of some subjective preference or prerogative and...
prevail in virtually every case.' 1 22 Legal commentators, tend to
agree. For example, Professor Kushner states:
Subjective conclusions,.., including when the applicant's per-
sonality was not what the seller was "looking for," or was argu-
mentative, caustic, sarcastic, acerbic, disagreeable, abrasive, or
non-congenial, when the applicant would not "fit in," was arro-
gant, abusive, obnoxious, extremely aggressive, uncooperative,
irritable, belligerent, a potential troublemaker, or wore unclean
clothing producing an offensive odor, will be suspect. Similarly,
that the applicant "didn't get along with the seller," "got a little
smart," had a bad attitude, constantly harassed, or was heard by
another to use profanity, and other hearsay accusations, are
likely to be rejected.'23
120. JAMES A. KUSHNER, FAIR HOUSING: DISCRIMINATION IN REAL ESTATE, COM-
MUNITY DEVELOPMENT, AND REVITALIZATION 293-94 (2d ed. 1995).
121. 610 F.2d 1032 (2d. Cir. 1979).
122. Id. at 1040 (quoting Elliot M. Mineberg, Comment, Applying the Title VII
Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 128, 182
(1976)(emphasis in original). See KUSHNER, supra note 120, at 293 ("The Court will
carefully scrutinize any reason which is not objective in nature, for subjective explana-
tions are generally viewed with considerable skepticism.")(citations omitted); Christo-
pher P. McCormick, Note, Business Necessity In Title VIII: Importing An
Employment Discrimination Doctrine into the Fair Housing Act, 54 FORDHAM L. REV.
563, 583 (1986)("Subjective considerations may influence the seller's decision. In
view of the congressional determination that race cannot be a factor in housing trans-
actions, however, such considerations deserve careful judicial scrutiny.")(citations
omitted).
123. KUSHNER, supra note 120, at 293-94 (citations omitted).
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Despite probing judicial scrutiny, cooperatives can successfully
rely on subjective factors if two criteria are met. First, the factor
should be relevant to the applicant's fitness as a purchaser or ten-
ant. 124 In other words, the criteria should be a reasonable measure
of the applicant's ability to be a successful owner or tenant.125 Sec-
ond, the defendant cooperative must credibly assert that the sub-
jective factors were the actual motivation for the decision. 26 As
the cooperative's case is usually presented through the testimony
of its board members, it is important that their testimony be credi-
ble and consistent.
1. Successful Assertion of Subjective Factor Defenses by
Cooperatives
In Murphy v. 253 Garth Tenants Corp.,127 the court considered
whether a subjective rationale for rejecting a cooperative applicant
could defeat a prima facie case of discrimination. 128 The court an-
swered its query affirmatively, stating that a co-op can succeed
based on the assertion of subjective factors when those factors are
presented in an honest and consistent fashion.
In Murphy, the plaintiffs alleged discrimination based on their
gender and Irish background. The defendant cooperative asserted
that it employed three criteria to judge the fitness of all applicants,
including the plaintiffs in this case: (1) whether the applicant in-
124. Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1041 ("[T]he logical relevance of the factor to the rejec-
tion [of the applicant] is of significance. If the factor (objective or subjective) lacks
relevance to the applicant's fitness in the housing context, it becomes suspect.");
Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34, 37 (N.D. Ohio 1976)("Objective criteria cannot
have the effect of excluding blacks from housing unless the criteria are demonstrably
a reasonable measure of the applicant's ability to be a 'successful tenant."');
KUSHNER, supra note 120, at 195-96 ("The factors must not lack relevance to the
applicant's fitness as a purchaser or tenant; the criteria must be reasonable measures
of the applicant's ability to be a successful owner or tenant.").
125. KUSHNER, supra note 120, at 195-96.
126. See, e.g., Robinson, 610 F.2d at 1041. The honesty or sincerity of the defense
put forth by a cooperative, whether objective or subjective, is always subject to re-
view. KUSHNER, supra note 120, at 193 (citing Robinson, 610 F.2d 1032). In Pughsley
v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Cooperative Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1056 (7th Cir. 1972), the
court recognized the defendant's "right to refuse approval on any honest basis unre-
lated to the race of the prospective purchaser or his associates." Professor Kushner
states that "[h]ousing may be refused on any honest basis unrelated to race."
KUSHNER, supra note 120, at 195 (citing Marable v. Walker & Assocs., 644 F.2d 390
(5th Cit. 1981); Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1974)(per curiam); Pughsley
v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972). But cf. McGraw
v. Oliver, 1 Fair Hous-Fair Lending (P-H) 15,539 (E.D. Va. Dec. 13, 1985)).
127. 579 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
128. Id. at 1152.
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tends to live in the apartment; (2) the applicant's financial capacity;
and (3) whether the applicant would be a good, congenial neigh-
bor, who fits in with the image of the cooperative. 2 9 The coopera-
tive asserted that one plaintiff was unresponsive and vague during
the board interview and that this was evidence that plaintiffs would
be unsatisfactory neighbors. 30
The court found the testimony of board members to be credible
and defendants prevailed on the discrimination claim. The court,
borrowing from Robinson, noted that the defendants' explanation
was neither "subtle" nor "synthetic, ' 131 but was based honestly on
their subjective discomfort with plaintiffs. 132 The plaintiffs failed to
establish that such explanations were pretextual, thus their discrim-
ination claim failed.' 33
Similar success based on the assertion of subjective justifications
was achieved by the respondent in Porreca v. 133 W, 75th St.,
Inc.'34 At the heart of the allegations were comments made by the
board president which allegedly reflected a bias against Italian-
Americans. At the hearing, the board president admitted that,
based on her experience with complainant, she found him to be
"unctuous," "unscrupulous,". "over-bearing," a "liar and briber,"
and one "who would suborn an officer.' 35 She also admitted
saying that if she were a "Mafioso" she "would hire him for a
bookkeeper. "136
Based on the board president's overall credibility, the tribunal
found that her comments and beliefs were not revealing of unlaw-
ful bias. First, complainant failed to establish that respondents had
knowledge that he was of Italian descent prior to their vote.' 37
Second, the court found that none of the words used by the board
president constituted a per se ethnic slur,138 and that she used the
word "mafioso" only in reference to herself and not the complain-
ant. 39 Third, the tribunal found in the record a basis for the board
129. Id. at 1154.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1155.
132. Id.
133. Murphy, 579 F. Supp. at 1155. The plaintiffs succeeded, however, in establish-
ing that their rejection was a violation of the co-op's by-laws, which required that
consent to transfer not be unreasonably withheld by the board.
134. Compl. No. 51180, Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Apr. 15, 1981).
135. Id. at 16, 17, 24.
136. Id. at 16.
137. Id. at 23.
138. Id. at 20.
139. Id. at 16.
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president's beliefs. 140 For example, the testimony of other share-
holders was consistent with her description of complainant. Thus,
complainant's claim was defeated by the assertion of a subjective
factor as a defense.
In Hitter v. Rubin,'141 defendant's motion for summary judgment
was granted after the defendant asserted that plaintiff "was dishon-
est and argumentative," certainly subjective factors. 42 Defend-
ants, however, supported their subjective rationale with objective
evidence. In Hitter, the plaintiff, who claimed age discrimination,
had knowingly lied about her financial worth. 43 The court found
defendants' substantiation of their defense sufficient to defeat
plaintiff's discrimination claim on their motion for summary
judgment. 144
A lack of credibility defeated the plaintiff's request for a prelimi-
nary injunction in Laurenti v. Water's Edge Habitat, Inc.145 In
Laurenti, the plaintiffs misrepresented the number of potential oc-
cupants for the apartment at issue by failing to report them on the
application and by not complying with the requirement that all po-
tential occupants attend the board interview. 46 Plaintiffs asserted
that defendants discriminated against them based on family status
because they rejected their application after learning that plaintiffs
had four, not two, children as the cooperative previously believed.
The court, however, rejected plaintiffs' claim. The court empha-
140. Porreca, Dec. & Ord. at 24.
141. 208 A.D.2d 480, 617 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1st Dep't 1994).
142. Id. at 481, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
143. Id. at 481, 617 N.Y.S.2d at 731.
144. It is somewhat surprising that the defendants in Hitter achieved success on
summary judgment given that subjective explanations are always fact-based and very
likely to be disputed. The cooperative in Sassower v. Field, 752 F. Supp. 1182
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), did not obtain summary judgment. In Sassower, the defendants re-
butted plaintiff's prima facie case by articulating 14 reasons for plaintiff's rejection.
Those reasons included the arrest and general conduct of a relative of the plaintiff, the
conduct and attitude of one of the plaintiffs, plaintiffs' flouting of certain house rules,
and other rationale best characterized as subjective. Id. at 1188. The plaintiffs put
forth a variety of arguments asserting that defendants' fourteen arguments were
pretextual. The court held that some of the arguments by plaintiffs, including the
original timing of defendant's assertions and the plaintiff's willingness to obviate some
of the defendant's stated concerns, revealed factual disputes to be decided only after a
trial on the merits. Id. at 1189-90. Thus, defendant's motion for summary judgment
failed. This seems the more likely result for summary judgment motions when a coop-
erative puts forth subjective defenses given the easily controverted nature of subjec-
tive explanations and the summary judgment standard.
145. 837 F. Supp. 507, 512 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
146. Id. at 508. Defendants also asserted that having six occupants, as opposed to
the expected four, would have violated the cooperative's by-laws and the village code.
Id.
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sized that it was not the plaintiffs' actual family size that motivated
the cooperative, but the plaintiffs' misrepresentation about the size
of their family that led to their rejection. 147
2. Unsuccessful Reliance on Subjective Factors by Cooperatives
When a cooperative board defends its actions with a subjective
rationale, the credibility of testifying board members becomes a
central issue. In particular, courts will carefully examine the con-
sistency of explanations given by individual board members as jus-
tification for rejecting a prospective purchaser.
In Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc.,148 board members testified
that they voted to reject the plaintiff based on rumors about the
plaintiff's proposed use of the apartment and the alleged animosity
displayed by the plaintiff during his interview. 149 The court looked
disfavorably on the assertion of rumors as the basis for plaintiff's
rejection, stating that, on remand, "the [trial] court must bear in
mind that rumors are easily started and, although perhaps facially
neutral, may easily be advanced with discriminatory intent.' 150
Concerning the defense that plaintiff displayed animosity, the
court noted that defendants could have provoked complainant's
perceived animosity by repeated and insistent questioning on cer-
tain issues. More important, the court found that the board mem-
bers quite divided on whether plaintiff really was full of animosity,
noting that seven of eleven shareholders had voted to accept the
plaintiff. Thus the cooperative's reliance on rumors and their in-
consistency in other areas undermined their overall credibility.
In Kirkpatrick v. 60 Sutton Corp.,' 5' the cooperative cited the
applicant's "hostile demeanor and vague responses about his
[other] residences and plans for the apartment" as justification for
his rejection.152 Upon careful scrutiny of this subjective rationale,
the tribunal found respondents' testimony to be confusing and un-
convincing.' 53 The tribunal underscored that one board member
described complainant as "extremely hostile, angry and red in the
face during the interview," while another board member described
147. Id. at 512.
148. 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979).
149. Id. at 1036.
150. Id. at 1041.
151. Compl. No. FH-164032991-DN, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (Oct. 30, 1992), adopted as
modified, Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Dec. 21, 1992).
152. Id. at 20-21.
153. Id. at 21.
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him as "polite and soft spoken.' 1 54 Thus, in what the tribunal char-
acterized as a close case, the cooperative's muddled assertions of
subjective factors could not overcome complainant's prima facie
case of discrimination based on his sexual orientation. 55
In Rives v. 164 23rd St. Jackson Heights, Inc.,156 the Commission
on Human Rights found that a number of board members credibly
testified about the subjective factors they relied upon in voting to
reject the complainant. Although honestly asserted, the tribunal
found them to be unsubstantiated by the record. One board mem-
ber noted that the complainant had not taken a deduction for char-
itable contributions on his taxes, and thus believed complainant
would not make a good neighbor. The determinative factor, how-
ever, was the tribunal's finding that the board president did take
complainant's national origin into consideration in rejecting his ap-
plication. Her testimony and the role she played in the decision-
making process undermined the defendant's case despite the credi-
ble testimony of other board members concerning subjective
factors.15
7
In Rives, the timing of the board's discussion of its subjective
explanations also had an impact on the cooperative's overall credi-
bility. The cooperative board met to list the reasons for denying
complainant's application years after the claim was filed and three
months prior to trial. 158 This was damaging to the board members'
collective credibility. 159
In sum, the cases demonstrate that for defendants to succeed
based on subjective justifications, the collective testimony of board
members must be consistent and their individual conclusions
should not undermine each other's rationales. Inconsistent and in-
sincere testimony on subjective factors is viewed by the court as an
indicator that unlawful bias may have played a role in the decision.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 20.
156. Compl. No. H-92-0115, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (July 31, 1995), adopted as modified,
Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Sept. 28, 1995).
157. Id. at 22 (citing Irizarry v. 120 West 70th Owners Corp., No. 86 Civ. 3503, 1986
WL 8073 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1986)). The tribunal noted "[elven if a trial court credits
certain non-discriminatory reasons advanced by a co-op board as genuine, it must
remember that race need not be the sole motivating factor for a complainant to suc-
ceed." Id.
158. Id. at 9.
159. Id. at 20 n.12. In Sassower v. Field, 752 F. Supp. 1182, 1189 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
the court stated that "the fact that the 14 reasons stated by defendants as supporting
their decision were not transmitted to the plaintiffs at the time of rejection, and were
first enunciated some time after the plaintiffs challenged the board's decision, contrib-
utes to the plaintiffs' claim of pretext."
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D. Disparate Treatment of Protected Classes By Cooperatives
During the Application Process
Another pitfall for a cooperative in a discrimination case is evi-
dence that it altered the application process or changed the rules in
a manner that had an adverse impact on the prospective purchaser.
Courts have readily inferred that such alteration or manipulation is
revealing of discriminatory animus on the part of the cooperative.
The courts' primary concern in such cases is whether cooperatives
are objectively and consistently applying uniform qualifications.
In Kirkpatrick v. 60 Sutton Corp.,16° the New York City Commis-
sion on Human Rights articulated a standard for weighing allega-
tions that the cooperative altered the application process in a
discriminatory manner. A prospective purchaser need only prove
that the cooperative's decision "to hold [plaintiff's] application to
higher [or different] standards or otherwise cause it to fail, was
negatively influenced by his membership in a protected class.' '1 6 1
In Kirkpatrick, the cooperative cited their concern that complain-
ant would not use the apartment as his primary residence as a fac-
tor in his rejection. The tribunal found that complainant was held
to a higher standard on this factor because many residents were
given permission to sublet their apartments and numerous others
did not use their apartments as a primary or frequent residence. 162
The tribunal found the differential treatment of the complainant to
be revealing of discriminatory animus.
Perhaps the most brazen instance of rigging the application pro-
cess to prevent entrance of certain minority group members oc-
curred in Huertas v. East River Housing Corp.16 3 The cooperative's
stated policy was to give priority consideration to young people,
newlyweds and children of residents.164 However, the court found
these criteria to be inapplicable when a white applicant was com-
peting for an apartment against a black or Hispanic applicant. 165
Blacks and Hispanics who should have been given priority status
were routinely passed in favor of whites with non-priority status.
The court concluded that the cooperative's selection criteria were
not applied in a consistent or uniform fashion:
160. Compl. No. FH-164032991-DN, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (Oct. 30, 1992), adopted,
Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Dec. 21, 1992).
161. Id. at 28.
162. Id.
163. 674 F. Supp. 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
164. Id. at 444.
165. Id. at 445.
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White applicants were universally chosen over blacks and His-
panics, despite more pressing needs made of minority appli-
cants, earlier filing of minority applications, and other factors
which should have given minority candidates priority. 16
6
The decision in Huertas is also replete with examples of how the
defendants used false and misleading information to discourage
minorities from applying and pursuing their applications. Black
and Hispanic applicants were told of long waiting lists, low turno-
ver rates and the possibility of a twenty-year delay before their ap-
plications would be reached.167  However, white applicants
frequently received apartments within a short time period. The
court also found information about vacant apartments to be tightly
controlled:
Because information concerning equity requirements, vacancies,
or criteria used in allocating apartments was not broadcast gen-
erally to the public, [current tenants] were an applicant's best
ally. All or principally all of the [current tenants] were white;
and they evidently served white applicants as both sources of
needed information and references to [cooperative manage-
ment]. Blacks and Hispanics were unable to penetrate this inner
circle. 68
The court held that the cooperative's misinformation campaign was
evidence of a "deliberate effort to perpetuate overwhelming white
occupancy within the cooperatives,"'' 69 and violative of Title
VIII.170
United States v. Youritan Constr. Co.' 71 presented similar facts in
the landlord-tenant context. In Youritan, the defendant engaged in
a multi-faceted scheme designed to discourage minority applicants.
The scheme included showing applicants the most expensive apart-
ments, giving them incomplete tours of the apartment complex,
and misrepresenting the availability of apartments. Also, rental
agents were instructed to emphasize the security deposit require-
ments to minority applicants and tell them that two-week credit
checks were required before renting. The court held that the
"[f]ailure to provide a black applicant with necessary and current
information concerning what he must do to become a tenant dis-
166. Id. at 453.
167. Id. at 444.
168. Id. at 453.
169. Huertas, 674 F. Supp. at 453.
170. Id. The court referred specifically to § 3604 of Title VIII and cited Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374 n.14 (1982).
171. 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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courages and impedes his application and results in his exclusion
from the apartments because of his race.' 172 The Youritan court
also found that such actions were part of an arbitrary and uncon-
trolled rental procedure which produced otherwise unexplained ra-
cially discriminatory results.
Thus, it is quite apparent that the inconsistent use of application
standards, especially as pertains to financial qualifications, will
serve to undermine a cooperative's asserted legitimate, non-dis-
criminatory reason for a rejection. 173
The courts also have frowned upon evidence that a cooperative
put new rules or procedures into place specifically for the applicant
at issue. In Shoyinka v. 120 25th Street Jackson Heights, Inc.,174 the
tribunal noted that despite their standard practice of voting by a
show of hands, the co-op board switched to a secret ballot for com-
plainants' application. This differential treatment was highlighted
when the board voted on a white applicant by a show of hands at
the same meeting.175 The cooperative also significantly altered the
composition of the board of directors just in time for a second vote
on complainant's application after the first vote ended in a tie.176
The tribunal noted that such activities had not occurred during the
pendency of applications submitted by whites, and concluded that
the cooperative purposefully altered prior practices to create insur-
mountable hurdles for the complainant. 177
Even more stunning and revelatory changes were made to the
application process with the goal of blocking the plaintiff's applica-
tion in Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc.178 In Robinson, the coop-
erative changed the informal application procedures applied to
previous applicants and, tellingly, did not apply those procedures
to other purchasers with applications pending at the same time as
plaintiff's. 179 The changes included the formation of a screening
172. Id. at 648, (citing United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221
(5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Reddoch, No. 6541-71-P, (S.D. Ala., Jan. 27, 1972),
affd, 467 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1972)).
173. Professor Kushner also lists the uneven application of rules as a red flag and
cites to numerous cases in which housing providers other than cooperatives manipu-
lated the application process to the detriment of the housing seeker. KUSHNER, supra
note 120, at 202 n.263.
174. Compl. No. FH-139061687-DH, Rec. Dec. & Ord. (Sept. 22, 1989), adopted,
Dec. & Ord. (N.Y.C.C.H.R. Dec. 21, 1989).
175. Id. at 37.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 610 F.2d 1032 (2d. Cir. 1979).
179. Id. at 1033-34, 1039.
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committee which was to meet with the prospective purchaser, con-
duct a background check and report to the shareholders-at-large
before a final vote. The board also voted to increase the percent-
age of votes needed to approve a share transfer from 51% to
66%.18 ° The increase to 66% occurred during the same meeting
and just before the vote on plaintiff's application. 181 The court held
that the "sequence of events brings a conclusion of discriminatory
motive well within the realm of legitimate inference. "182
VI. Recommendations for Prospective Purchasers
and Cooperatives
The unique structure of cooperative ownership and self-govern-
ance enables shareholders to carefully craft and maintain their liv-
ing environment. This includes the cooperative board's power to
select who gets into the cooperative. Statistical data and anecdotal
evidence support claims that some cooperatives wield their selec-
tion power in an unlawfully discriminatory manner. The courts and
civil rights agencies will not hesitate to scrutinize cooperative deci-
sion-making when discrimination is alleged, despite the general
rule of judicial deference to cooperative decision-making as set
forth in Levandusky.l8 3 The resolution of such claims often turns
on whether the cooperative relied on objective or subjective factors
in rejecting the applicant and whether the court finds that the co-
operative's defense was sincerely and consistently presented.
What can cooperatives do to avoid discrimination claims? An
obvious but infrequently invoked measure is to take steps to pre-
vent the prejudices of cooperative shareholders from having an im-
pact upon the selection process. All shareholders should be well
versed in fair-housing laws and understand the ramifications of
breaking them. The cooperative may want to consider diversity or
sensitivity training in an attempt to root out deep-seated
prejudices.
The cooperative also should take steps to formalize the applica-
tion process, including the establishment of objective criteria to
evaluate applicants. The cooperative should document each step
180. Id. at 1034.
181. Id. The change in percentage affected the outcome of the vote on plaintiff's
application as 7 of 11 shareholders, or 63.7%, voted in favor of the plaintiff, enough to
gain acceptance under the prior standard.
182. Id. at 1039.
183. 75 N.Y.2d 530, 553 N.E.2d 1317, 554 N.Y.S.2d 807 (1990). See supra Part III-B
for a discussion of Levandusky.
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of the application process for all applicants and provide rejected
applicants with written explanations at the time of notification.
Documenting the process and providing written explanations to re-
jected applicants will counter charges that the cooperative manu-
factured their reasons to disguise discriminatory motives only after
litigation commenced.
What should applicants do when they suspect that their member-
ship in a protected class18 influenced their rejection? First, and
prior to the decision, the applicant should submit a complete and
truthful application to the cooperative. Valid charges of discrimi-
nation claims may be easily defeated if an applicant is dishonest, or
even sloppy, at any point in the application process. Applicants
should keep careful notes during the application process, particu-
larly of the board interview. They should demand an explanation
of their rejection from the cooperative, although the cooperative is
not obligated to provide one. Besides pleading for reconsideration,
which is sometimes granted but rarely results in acceptance, the
applicant's road to redress is through legal action. Depending on
the desirability of the cooperative unit at issue, it may not remain
available for long and therefore the applicant should file for an
injunction to prevent the sale of the unit to someone else.
Discrimination cases usually rest on circumstantial evidence and
thus are difficult to prove. Cases against cooperatives are no ex-
ception. In the absence of an explicitly discriminatory "smoking-
gun" statement from a prejudicial shareholder at the board inter-
view, the applicant should attempt to establish that the coopera-
tive's proffered reasons for rejecting the applicant are insincere and
inconsistent, and thus simply a facade for discriminatory motives.
Especially revealing are comparisons of the applications of previ-
ously accepted and rejected candidates. Such evidence may reveal
differential treatment of the applicant, if not a pattern and practice
of discrimination against certain minority groups.
Cooperative apartment buildings will remain an important part
of the New York City housing market into the foreseeable future.
Thus, as a community we must take measures to ensure that coop-
erative housing is equally available to all New Yorkers. This re-
quires cooperatives to take affirmative steps to root out prejudice
from their selection procedure and a vigilant civil rights community
ready to enforce the law when discrimination becomes evident.
184. See supra Table 4 (enumeration of protected classes).
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